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Reviews and Discussion 
eth-century abstract painting draw considerably on the 
debates about ornament in the nineteenth century. 
True, he occasionally offers contemporary abstrac-
tions as examples of some of the effects discussed . 
However, Gombrich draws a fundamental distinction 
between such matters and his aim: " Remembering my 
own normal reaction to decoration before I had em-
barked on this investigation, I was tempted to call this 
book 'The Unregarded Art.' ... Painting, like speaking, 
implicitly demands attention whether or not it receives 
it. Decoration cannot make this demand. It normally 
depends for its effect on the fluctuating attention we 
can spare while we scan our surroundings'' (p. 116). 
So Gombrich, no great fan of abstract painting (1963), 
has chosen to complement his study of realistic repre-
sentation in Art and Illusion with a study not of those 
abstractions and semiabstractions that hang on the 
important walls of important museums and mansions, 
but of the ones that hug coffee spoons and archi-
tectural columns, the ones we take for granted. 
One could regret this. I confess myself to a moment 
of regret when, halfway through The Sense of Order, I 
happened to visit the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard 
University. On display was a Calder piece, standing on 
the floor about chest high, its top a horizontal gesture 
of wires and metal plates pivoting on the base. For 
some reason, I found it wholly engaging. Not only did it 
allow, even compel, my regard, but it departed strik-
ingly from the perceptual armamentarium of ornamen-
tal design. There was little repetition in a narrow 
sense. There was calculated asymmetry. The curvilin-
earities were complex, but within the reach of vision to 
know them one by one and all together, a feast for the 
eye where one could consume every dish, to reverse 
Gombrich's expression. "This," I said to myself, "has 
nothing to do with the sense of order." 
But in the end there were no regrets. The old saying 
about gift horses seems relevant here. E. H. Gombrich 
has made us his gift, and there is no need to grumble 
about how he could have done this or could have done 
that. He has, in fact, chosen a neglected corner of our 
vision and sought to illuminate it for us. The point is 
nicely made by the way he frames his discussion-
with a discussion of a picture frame. At the close of his 
introduction, Gombrich has a few remarks to make 
about an elaborate picture frame, circa 1700, sur-
rounding the Madonna della Sedia by Raphael. 
Gombrich says, in part, '' ... on the face of it, it seems 
an extraordinarily pointless activity to expend so much 
skill and labour on carving and gilding these festoons 
with laurel leaves and berries, stretched between fic-
titious curly brackets of extraordinary elaboration, 
which fasten them between shell-shaped forms'' (p. 
15). 8-~t by the end of the last chapter, Gombrich is 
ready to return with his readers of more informed per-
ception to this same frame. "To the reader who has 
shared this journey with me it should have looked pro-
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gressively less puzzling. We recognize in it a version of 
the cartouche with four animated motifs oriented to-
ward the field of force they enhance. They are proge-
nies of Gorgon's heads ... "And so on. Yes, the 
frame has become more meaningful, one's vision less 
naive, in consequence of the rite of passage imposed 
by The Sense of Order. 
Note 
1 This review was prepared at Project Zero , Harvard Graduate School of 
Education, with support from the Spencer Foundation . The opinions ex-
pressed here do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of sup-
porting agencies. 
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Reviewed by Carla Sarett 
University of Pennsylvania 
That there is an essentially metaphorical component in 
many diverse realms of symbolic behavior has become 
a popular, and even fashionable, concept, and thus it 
seems particularly timely to consider some of the phil-
osophical implications of the concept of metaphor it-
self. The publication of this latest collection of essays, 
which had originally appeared as an issue of Critical 
Inquiry, should serve to alert scholars to the richness 
of contemporary thinking on metaphor that can gener-
ally benefit discussions of symbolic phenomena. While 
much of the debate in this volume is aimed explicitly at 
problems in literary communication, this approach 
should not prevent a fruitful extension to related issues 
in other fields. Furthermore, the concept of metaphor 
is not only relevant to the objects we seek to under-
stand but sheds considerable light on the very process 
of analysis. Metaphor, then, seems doubly relevant: It 
clarifies the structure of certain forms of symbolic 
communication and theories about communication as 
well. 
Many readers, however, may encounter some diffi-
culty in reading these essays: A good deal of knowl-
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edge about metaphor as well as philosophy is by and 
large assumed; the reader approaching this book as 
an introduction will occasionally be both frustrated and 
baffled. On the other hand, the greater one's exposure 
to the history of the debate on metaphor, the more cer-
tain is the feeling that the present collection does not 
significantly broaden the scope of that debate. Given 
the Foreword's promise, one might have hoped that a 
truly interdisciplinary perspective would emerge. Such 
a perspective would gain theoretical sophistication 
and force from the recent contributions of theories on 
play, humor, ritual, and linguistic anthropology, to 
name but a few potentially exciting resources. Without 
in any way diminishing the value of aesthetic and liter-
ary theory to the subject of metaphor, it is fair to say 
that the exclusion of divergent points of view restricts 
the boundaries of the discussion. True, there are offer-
ings from developmental psychology, art, and theol-
ogy, but in crucial ways these accept the basic logic of 
the philosophical debate and do not change its shape 
in the way that, for example, Bateson's communica-
tional theory does (Bateson 1972). For that matter, 
certain philosophical objections to theories of meaning 
and literal language would gain momentum from re-
cent developments in sociolinguistics, where notions 
of ordinary language have been attacked (cf. Kir-
schenblatt-Gimblett 1976). 
The collection can be thought of as addressing 
three basic, and not unrelated, questions. The first 
asks to what extent, and in what manner, metaphor 
can be said to possess cognitive content. This issue is 
best encountered in the essays by Paul Ricoeur and 
Donald Davidson, whose views stand in opposition to 
one another, but reverberations of it are heard 
throughout all the essays. In part, the second question 
forms a response to the first: To what extent can meta-
phor be best explained by its contextual use in social 
discourse? Here we find suggestions from psychology, 
philosophy, and rhetoric that much is to be gained 
from a context-dependent notion of metaphorical 
meaning. The other essays can be seen to explore the 
consequences that various root metaphors have in 
their respective disciplines and to pose the related 
question of whether there can exist a discourse not 
fundamentally permeated by metaphor. 
Historically, the first question has been the crucial 
one, with centuries of scholars expelling metaphor 
from the province of cognitive discourse. Vico and the 
romantic movement posed the first vigorous challenge 
to this traditional prejudice, insisting that language's 
original roots are primarily metaphorical and further-
more claiming a primacy of the poetic function in re-
vealing the world as it is experienced; however, the ro-
mantic view still retained the traditional exclusion of 
metaphor from intellectual activity, even if it reversed 
the priority of that activity. It was in this century, per-
haps when scientific discourse became increasingly 
self-conscious about its use of explanatory models, 
that the role of metaphor in cognition earned legiti-
macy. Most would locate the pivotal text as Max 
Black's Models and Metaphors, in which the inter-
action theory of metaphor was proposed, claiming, 
among other things, that metaphor was not reducible 
to literal assertions and that metaphor does not so 
much formulate an antecedent similarity as create it. 
In this intellectual era the notion of truth as created 
rather than discovered has found ready acceptance. 
Still, the status of such newly generated "meaning" or 
"truth" does remain problematic in relation to conven-
tionally accepted, or literal, truths. One can reject 
metaphor in a way that is clearly forbidden with literal 
assertions, and the grounds on which one rejects the 
two differ in important ways. To participate in an imagi-
native vision is perhaps to gain certain insight, but 
tempered by the understanding that such insight may 
be rejected. Donald Davidson's essay insists that we 
not confuse such insight with meaning. His claim is 
that there is no hidden message in metaphor apart 
from its literal meaning. Theories of metaphor have 
mistaken the effect of the metaphor, which is to stimu-
late and invite comparison, for an encoded content. 
"The common error," claims Davidson, "is to fasten 
on the contents of the thoughts a metaphor provokes 
and to read these contents into the metaphor itself." 
Such a hard-headed stance certainly makes a star of 
Davidson, prompting heated responses from such wor-
thy opponents as Nelson Goodman and Max Black. 
The predictable problems of the ensuing dialogue re-
sult, in part, from highly divergent notions of "mean-
ing" as well as "cognitive content." Karsten Harries's 
neat reminder that certain slang expressions ("He's an 
ac-dc") clearly do express cognitive content disposes 
of part of Davidson's argument. Harries is subtle 
enough to realize, however, that to the extent that Da-
vidson is dealing with more complex examples of po-
etic metaphor, he may indeed be onto something, 
since the "aboutness" of such metaphors is always 
elusive (cf. Sperber 1977). 
Paul Ricoeur takes the position that metaphor does 
have the capacity to provide untranslatable informa-
tion and yield true insights about reality, and that it has 
this capacity by virtue of certain psychological proc-
esses, those of imagination and feeling. His thesis, in 
brief, is that the metaphoric form of "split reference" 
is structurally analogous to the processes of imagina-
tion and feeling, which themselves constitute the com-
plete metaphorical process. Both imagination and feel-
ing involve a "suspension" of literal systems of 
reference and emotion by which we are able to main-
tain the tensional viewpoint required by metaphor and 
assimilate new meanings. The metaphorical process 
allows us to actively shape and participate in the crea-
tion and articulation of meaning in ways denied us by 
ordinary language, whose meanings have already 
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been given to us. In metaphor, the new semantic con-
gruence is both "felt" and "seen," that is, "We are in-
cluded in the process as knowing subjects'' {p. 154). 
Through this, we become aware of aspects of reality 
''which cannot be expressed in terms of the objects 
referred to in ordinary language' ' (p 156). While Ri-
coeur's debt to Heidegger is clear, his theory also 
bears interesting similarities to Michael Polanyi's the-
ory of knowledge in The Tacit Dimension, and a com-
parison of Polanyi's "tacit knowing" to Ricoeur's me-
taphorical process might further illuminate the 
question of how metaphor functions in cognition. 
So intriguing are the structural properties of meta-
phor that they have overshadowed other aspects of 
the picture. Recently, however, theorists have shifted 
from a purely semiotic approach to one focusing on 
contextual features and the relationship between the 
speakers, touching upon the interrelationship between 
systems of signification and communication. The es-
says by Cohen, Davidson, and Booth reflect this trend 
with varying degrees of success. 
Ted Cohen's essay reflects the problem alluded to 
earlier, that of a philosophy unaided by theoretical po-
sitions on human communication. He is vulnerable to 
this charge for the simple reason that his analysis, 
dealing with the establishment of intimacy through 
metaphor, might have benefited greatly from such the-
ory. Cohen finds metaphors like jokes in that they both 
presuppose prior knowledge on the part of the speak-
ers, and both serve to establish a sense of bonding 
from the acknowledgment of such knowledge. Litera-
ture on humor enlightens us as to the multiple com-
plexities of such relationships, making Cohen's analy-
sis seem oddly narve (Fry 1 963). 
Wayne Booth's discussion of metaphor from the tra-
ditional approach of rhetoric is a refreshing reminder 
that the functional perspective on language did not 
arise with speech act theory; furthermore, his defini-
tion of metaphor as "all symbolic inventions that are 
intended to be taken non literally'' permits him an ad-
mirably broad vision of the subject (p. 50). 
The power of contextual factors is given empirical 
support from developmental studies of metaphorical 
competence. Howard Gardner and Ellen Winner sug-
gest that children's understanding of metaphors is en-
hanced by embedding them in a situational context 
rather than drawing upon prior lexical knowledge. Also 
of interest are their studies of brain-damaged patients, 
which raise intriguing possibilities. Asked to match 
simple tropes with appropriate pictures, aphasiacs 
were able to make the correct selection while remain-
ing incapable of paraphrasing the same metaphor; 
right-hemisphere patients, on the other hand, dis-
played the opposite tendency and offered accurate 
paraphrase with no corresponding ability to select the 
appropriate picture. Gardner and Winner conclude 
that ''the neuropsychological evidence suggests that 
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both the pragmatic and featural perspectives, taken 
together, have some validity, with the crucial variable 
being the kinds of tasks posed and responses re-
quired'' (p. 138). 
The remainder of the essays illustrate how meta-
phor permeates different realms of social discourse. 
Paul de Man's reading of Locke, Condillac, and Kant 
finds their philosophical positions on metaphor fraught 
with figurative language. Analyzing these metaphors 
as a result of particular rhetorical strategies, he con-
cludes that philosophy ''to the extent that it is depen-
dent on figuration" is literary, and cannot be under-
stood properly unless such repressed metaphors are 
laid bare. Karsten Harries similarly calls attention to 
Heidegger's writings on the ways metaphor shapes 
philosophy, making "explicit the fact that philosophi-
cal texts refer us less to reality than back to other phil-
osophical texts'' (p. 83). 
It should be emphasized that to admit the metapho-
rical component in disciplines such as science or phi-
losophy does not impoverish the theories they gener-
ate. Granted, the presence of repressed metaphor 
alerts us to certain normative commitments, but this 
should not diminish our appreciation of the ex-
planatory function of models in general. Nor should it 
commit us to the hapless relativism that scientific theo-
ries are, at best, arbitrary fictions. As Karsten Harries 
argues, the modern recognition of the impossibility of 
an unmediated reality does not render the belief in ob-
jectivity itself meaningless. On the contrary, the very 
ability to identify, analyze, and evaluate individual per-
spectives leads us to pursue a viewpoint which would 
permit a truly objective means of encountering reality. 
Lacking any belief in this possibility would undermine 
the basis of scientific knowledge altogether (Polanyi 
1967). Furthermore the commitment to objectivity de-
mands that we explore scientific models in terms of 
what they can reveal and explain about observed phe-
nomena (Hesse 1966:162). By affirming the legitimate 
role metaphor plays in intellectual activity, we can bet-
ter understand the insights and achievements of scien-
tific theory, not confusing theory with literal descrip-
tion or carelessly rejecting it in the name of relativism. 
The role of metaphor is further clarified by David 
Tracy's detailed account of religious and theological 
use of metaphor. Although a reader's unfamiliarity with 
contemporary theology may make Tracy's a particu-
larly difficult essay, it is worth reading for its success-
ful integration of the interaction theory of metaphor 
with concrete textual analysis. Arguing that the study 
of metaphor is central to the understanding of religious 
experience and thinking, Tracy notes: 
The statement "God is love" does not say literally what 
God is, but produces a metaphorical meaning for what 
God is like. In this redescriptive sense, the statement de-
fines who, for the Christian, God is. [p. 1 03] 
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Tracy convincingly demonstrates that a view of meta-
phor that refuses its capacity to generate new mean-
ings cannot do justice to the role metaphor plays in re-
ligious thinking. 
Caution must be taken, though, in extending 
Tracy's analysis to a more general notion of the truth 
value of metaphor. In the case of Scripture, it seems 
clear that metaphor does indeed help to establish a 
world. But, one is forced to wonder with Karsten Har-
ries, ''to what extent does the scriptural paradigm help 
to illuminate poetry in general and, more especially, 
the poetry of this godless age?" (p . 172). Harries ar-
gues that contemporary poetry as well as art stands in 
a radically different relation to reality than do the 
words of Scripture, consequently producing a different 
use of metaphor. His discussion traces some of the 
movements in notions of poetic unity and metaphor. 
He locates the telling moment in the transition from the 
traditional mimetic theory, which viewed art as about 
reality and saw its object as potentially transcending 
human understanding, to the aesthetic view of art, 
which insists that art be autotelic and resistant to mim-
esis. Referentiality, according to the aesthetic view, 
threatens the telos of the work of art insofar as it re-
lates to a reality outside art. Thus, the purpose of art is 
to be a "thing" in the world, to resist its own inherently 
metaphorical structure. The work of art is always at 
once a material object and a communication, but the 
pursuit of presence seeks, in effect, to repress the lat-
ter. Insofar as referentiality seems to be unavoidable, 
the pursuit of such presence inevitably creates a ten-
sion, which Harries relates to the prevalence of colli-
sion metaphor in modern poetry, where ordinary 
meanings of words are subverted altogether. The 
paradoxical reversal of this is that as poetry, as well as 
art, approaches this extreme denial of meaning 
it may acquire a revelatory power all its own: from the 
ruins of literal sense emerges not a new semantic con-
gruence but a silence that is heard as the language of 
transcendence. [p. 172] 
Furthermore, Harries's hermeneutical account makes 
it clear that metaphor is not always best confined to 
the domain of pragmatics and the "overly restricted 
theory of meaning on which it rests' ' (p. 169). A theory 
of meaning that denies that sedimentation of rich 
meanings that attach themselves to words and sym-
bols also denies us access to the potentialities of artis-
tic and poetic works. There is a peculiar process at 
work when these associations are declared somehow 
less "real " than univocal meanings. It is important to 
note that such deliberations about meaning do not 
have merely philosophical consequences, especially 
for those of us who are interested in artistic in-
tepretation. Not only is the potential meaning of a text 
a fundamental presupposition upon which acts of in-
terpretation rest; it is also the case that textual analy-
sis, by suppressing the availability of multivocal inter-
pretation, is restricted and, in many cases, unjustified. 
Our commonsense notions inform us that we can 
"miss the point" of a metaphor, a film, or a painting, 
and we believe that additional information and knowl-
edge can enlighten us. Lacking such notions, art his-
torical intepretation becomes absurd. Thus, the ques-
tion of metaphor is inevitably drawn back into the 
larger issues of meaning and communication which 
must support it. 
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Reviewed by Diane C. Freedman 
Temple University 
As the interest of social scientists in the expressive 
forms of culture increases, new methods are needed 
to analyze these forms on a scientific basis. Research-
ers in dance and body movement have such a tool in 
Labanotation, a rigorous and highly developed system 
for the analysis and notation of all forms of movement. 
Labanotation (Hutchinson 1954) is the trade name 
for a system of movement notation developed by Ru-
dolf Laban, a dance educator-scholar born in Bratis-
lava in 1879 (Thorton 1971 ), who revolutionized the 
dance world through both his philosophy of movement 
and his pragmatic approaches to movement-related 
problems. Nahumck has presented us with an in-
troduction to this system designed for dancer and re-
